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Abstract 
Economics in general, and the theory of the firm more specifically, places 
motivation and cognition in very different analytical boxes, in spite of 
cognitive science evidence that the boundaries between the two are in 
reality blurred.  While this analytical assumption has often served the 
theory of the firm well, a number of organizational phenomena are better 
understood if cognition and motivation are allowed to interact, for 
example, through framing effects, as organizational scholars have long 
argued. The paper exemplifies by developing the implications of this for 
Williamson’s notion of the “impossibility of selective intervention.”   
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I. Introduction 
Organizational theorists (March and Simon 1958) and management thinkers 
(Barnard 1938) have long recognized that cognition and motivation are intimately 
connected, and that understanding their interrelations may be central to successful 
organizational design as well as managerial practice.  Consider, for example, James 
March’s (1994) notion of the “logic of appropriateness,” that is, people often act 
according to what they (and others) consider to be appropriate in a certain context 
(e.g., “What should I do as a marketing executive in this situation?”), rather than 
what is strictly maximizing.1   The thrust of the logic of appropriateness is that how 
a person (cognitively) frames a situation influences what motivates him and how 
strongly.   
 There is more than casual evidence that cognition and motivation interacts in 
such a manner.  Thus, there is an expanding scholarly literature in various branches 
of cognitive science that speaks directly to this issue.  Some parts of the “heuristics 
and biases” literature in experimental psychology, notably work on framing effects 
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1987) and preference reversal (Tversky, Slovic and 
Kahneman 1990), may be interpreted in this manner.  Moreover, this kind of 
psychological research suggests that the kind of interaction of motivation and 
cognition here exemplified by the logic of appropriateness is not a behavioral 
anomaly, but rather a relatively systematic aspect of real-world behavior, including 
how agents behave in organizations and as managers (Bazerman 1994).  Other parts 
of cognitive science, such as the “fast and frugal heuristics” program (Gigerenzer 
and Selten 2002) and evolutionary psychology more generally suggest even more 
radically that the distinction between motivation and cognition often cannot be 
upheld.  It is at best an analytical distinction.  
 Economics is increasingly making headway in the organization and 
management fields (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  Given the fragmentary and 
                                                 
1 March’s notion of the “logic of appropriateness” is an updating of what Max Weber much earlier 
had called “valuational action”.   
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often sloppy nature of much inquiry in management studies, this is assuredly to be 
welcomed.  However, a major problem appears to be that in most of economics — 
the emerging field of behavioral economics being an exception —, cognition and 
motivation are separate boxes (hence, the sub-title to this paper).   Of course, there 
is, and must be, a link between cognition and motivation; incentives that motivate 
behavior have to be discovered, and optimal decisions, given incentives, have to be 
calculated — and discovery and calculation are cognitive operations.   However, 
there is no interaction, because virtually all of economics assumes cognitive 
homogeneity, that is, agents hold the same, correct, model of the world, and cognitive 
constancy, that is, agents’ model of the world do not change. There is no cognitive 
variation that allows motivational factors to be framed in different ways, and, in 
turn, motivational factors are not allowed to impact on cognitive factors.2   
 The (economic) theory of the firm, or broader, of economic organization, is no 
exception to this generalization (Foss 2000).   In agency theory and transaction cost 
economics, moral hazard and perfect rationality, and opportunism and bounded 
rationality, respectively, are entirely separate assumptions, and there is no mention 
of any direct interaction effect.  Similarly, though often strongly critical of such 
assumptions as moral hazard and opportunism, heterodox approaches to economic 
organization ¾ notably the capabilities (competence, knowledge-based, etc.) 
approach (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982; Kogut and Zander 1992) ¾ have not 
inquired into the separation of motivation and cognition, mainly because 
motivational issues are largely black-boxed in this body of theory.    
 In the following, I begin by briefly and critically discussing cognitive and 
motivational issues in the contemporary economics of organization.  I then move on 
to the more constructive ask of discussing the possible implications for the theory of 
economic organization of acknowledging the interaction between cognition and 
                                                 
2 Interaction between the cognitive and motivational domains enters at best through “incentives for 
learning,” as in labor economics, where, however, either there is no real cognitive change going on 
(or, it is not explicitly modeled).   
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motivation is discussed.  I concentrate on Oliver Williamson’s (1996) notion of the 
“impossibility of selective intervention.”    
II. The Treatment of Cognition and Motivation 
in the Theory of the Firm 
The Theory of the Firm 
 The basic features of the emergence of the theory of the firm are well-known: 
As the story is normally told, the theory of the firm traces its existence back to 
Coase’s landmark 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm.”  Coase argued that in the 
world of neoclassical price theory, firms have no reason to exist.  The reason why 
firms existed after all, Coase reasoned, must be that there is a “cost to using the 
price mechanism” (Coase 1937: 390), that is to say, transaction costs.  After pointing 
out that the nature of the firm consists largely in substituting an employment 
contract for a spot contract in output, Coase suggests that the real costs of contracts 
may lie in their inflexibility.  “It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the 
supply of some article or service,” he writes. 
Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of 
the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less 
possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing 
to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may 
well be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or 
commodity which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the 
purchaser of that commodity or service. But the purchaser will not 
know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take.  
Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general 
terms, the exact details being left until a later date. ... The details of 
what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is 
decided later by the purchaser.  When the direction of resources 
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(within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in 
this way, that relationship which I term a “firm” may be obtained. 
(Coase 1937: 391-392.) 
This passage suggests that Coase’s explanation for the emergence of the firm is 
ultimately a coordination one: The firm is an institution that lowers the costs of 
qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty (Langlois and Foss 1999).  Thus, 
broadly cognitive issued was present at the inception of the theory of the firm.   In 
contrast, it may be noted that Coase has nothing to say about motivation.   In 
contrast, what has driven later contributions to the theory of the firm is much less 
cognitive issues than it is motivational issues, specifically the incentive conflicts 
caused by morally hazardous or opportunistic behaviour (coupled with imperfect 
contracting).  In fact, a case may be made that cognitive issues have been almost 
crowded out by incentive issues, surviving at best in the notion of “bounded 
rationality” ?  a notion that is so vaguely defined in this body of theory as to be 
virtually a black box (more about this later).     
 Still, the post-Coasian theory of the firm has followed Coase in conceptualizing 
the firm as a contractual entity whose existence, boundaries and internal 
organization can be rendered intelligible in terms of economizing with (various 
types of) transaction costs.  This is not to say that any one theory in modern 
organizational economics has addressed all these three key issues in terms of the 
same unified framework and making use of the same kind of transaction costs.  
Indeed, a possible perspective on the division of labor that exists within the modern 
theory of the firm is that whereas the principal-agent (Holmström and Milgrom 
1991) and the team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972) approaches are mainly 
relevant for understanding issues that relate to internal organization, the transaction 
cost approach (Williamson 1985) and the property rights approach (Hart 1995; Hart 
and Moore 1990) have mainly been applied to the understanding of the issue of the 
boundaries of the firm.  Relatedly, these approaches have stressed different kinds of 
transaction costs, the principal-agent approach emphasizing costs of monitoring, the 
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property rights approach emphasizing costs of writing (complete) contracts, and the 
transaction cost approach similarly emphasizing writing costs, but perhaps 
particularly costs of haggling that may arise ex post the signing of a contract.3 
 Of the four mentioned approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the 
property rights approach are conventionally considered as theories of the firm.  The 
basic reason is that neither team theory nor principal-agent theory explain asset 
ownership, that is, they do not explain the boundaries of the firm.  Such an 
explanation must presuppose that contracts are incomplete, because otherwise 
everything can be contractually stipulated and there will be no need for ownership 
understood as something that confers the “residual right” to make decisions that are 
not contracted for.  Team theory and principal agent theory assume complete 
contracts, whereas transaction cost economics and property rights theory work off 
from an incomplete contracting foundations. Accordingly, the main emphasis will 
be on the latter two approaches.  
Specific Assets and Incomplete Contracts 
 Following Oliver Williamson, particular emphasis has come to be placed in 
these approaches upon specific (or highly complementary) assets in explaining the 
boundaries of the firm.4  In this story, assets are highly specific when there is a high 
difference between their value in the present (best) use and the second-best use.  
This opens the door to, and provides the incentive for, opportunism in the form of 
“hold-up”.  Once the contract is signed and the assets deployed, one of the parties 
may threaten to pull out of the arrangement — thereby reducing the value of the 
specific assets — unless a greater share of the quasi-rents of joint production find 
their way into the threat-maker’s pockets.   Fear of such “hold up” ex post will affect 
investment choices negatively ex ante.  This means that the joint surplus flowing 
from the relation will not be as high as it could if there were no fear of opportunism.  
                                                 
3 This is a bit of a rational reconstruction on my part: Formal contract theorists, such as principal-
agent or property right theorists, are not too comfortable with the notion of “transaction cost.”   
4 For expository reasons, I here suppress the differences between the Williamsonian and Hartian 
versions of this story.  
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Integration may no so much do away with opportunism proclivities as it might 
change the incentives to engage in opportunism.  By giving property rights to the 
(non-human) assets in the relation to the party whose investments matter most to 
the size of the joint surplus, the negative effects of opportunism can be minimized 
though never completely eliminated (Hart 1995). 
 The basic problem in this story is that contracts are left incomplete, for example, 
because the transaction costs of drafting complete contracts are prohibitive.   It is the 
need to make decisions under circumstances that are not covered by the contract 
that makes hold-up and its consequences possible.   In its modern, mainstream 
economics version (e.g., Hart and Moore 1990), this story, like most of 
contemporary microeconomics, is cast in the language of game theory.   A simplistic 
version of the basic incomplete contract argument emerges from the following 
games in normal form.     
                  Game 1                   Game 2 
 
  B                         B  
       x    y                 x                y 
 x           2,2              0,0                x           2,2                  0,0  
A                        A 
 y           0,0              4,1                         y           0,0              4-u,1+u 
 
Following Hurwicz (1972) one can in an abstract manner think of economic agents 
as choosing game forms and equilibria thereof for regulating their trade.  Efficiency 
requires that if agents can find a game form and an equilibrium thereof that allow 
them to do better, they will do so.  In conformity with the game theoretical 
economics of organization literature, everything in these games is “common 
knowledge,” that is, “player A knows that player B knows that player A knows that 
….. h is the case,” where “h” can be pay-offs, strategies, and the identity of the other 
player. 
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 The two players begin by confronting Game 1.  The problem here is that the 
Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique equilibrium, since both the (2,2) and 
(4,1) may be equilibria on this criterion.   Now, obviously the (4,1) equilibrium has a 
higher joint surplus than the (2,2) equilibrium.  Therefore, it will be in A’s interest to 
bribe B to play the y-strategy.  If u, the bribe, lies between 1 and 2, the equilibrium 
corresponding to both A and B playing y will be efficient, and, hence, be chosen.  
Thus, efficiency now implies that the agents agree on (contract on) maximizing and 
somehow splitting the joint surplus.   In this situation, a market failure occurs when 
bribes cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Whether this occurs or not may be 
critically sensitive to the timing of the game.  For example, if A gives B the bribe 
before the game begins, B will not choose the y-strategy, which means that A will 
decide not to give B any bribe.  Or, A may promise B to pay the bribe after game, 
but B will realize that this will not be in A’s interest, and will still choose the x-
strategy.  Although the (2,2) equilibrium is still efficient, it is not joint-surplus 
maximizing.    
 These market failures may be remedied through contractual means; for 
example, A may agree to pay B a compensation if he does not pay u, or B may agree 
to pay A a compensation if he does not choose the y-strategy after receiving u.  
However, such contracts may not always be feasible.   Contracts fail in the sense 
that they cannot completely safeguard against the reduction of surplus/loss of 
welfare stemming from incentive conflicts (given risk preferences).   Contract failure 
may take various forms.  For example, contracts may be incomplete in the sense that 
some contingencies are left out for whatever reasons.  In the context of the example, 
A may confronted with a contingency that is not covered by the contract, refuse to 
pay B the bribe, and B may have no recourse.  Or, while it may be possible in 
principle for partners to agree on contract terms, these may not be enforceable by a 
third party, such as a court.  In the latter case, contract terms are said to be “non-
verifiable.”  Or, the costs of contracting may outweigh the gains.   In all of these 
cases, it may not be possible to sustain the first-best outcome, that is, the one that 
unambigiously maximizes joint-surplus.  Given contract failure, the analytical 
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enterprise is therefore one of comparing alternative contracting arrangements in 
terms of their implications for the joint surplus from a relation.  For example, one 
may compare Nash equilibria that differ in terms of the underlying distribution of 
bargaining strengths (for example, as given by ownership patterns).   
Cognition 
 The above normal form game representation has been chosen as an illustrative 
device not just because of its simplicity, but also because of the epistemic 
assumptions, namely common knowledge of players, payoffs and strategies, that 
accompany this sort of representation.  At least in the example, the players confront 
no ambiguity.5 The same assumptions are made in formal contract theory.  
Epistemically, contract theory models usually work with an “on-off” approach  
(Foss and Foss 2000, 2001), in which players are either perfectly informed about a 
relevant variable or have very little information about it, or in which a variable (e.g., 
investment levels) is perfectly contractible or not contractible at all because the 
third-party (that enforces the contract) have very little relevant information.  
Typically, the “economic action” is produced by “switching off” one variable by 
assuming, often in an entirely arbitrary fashion, that one or more agents know very 
little about it(s realization) and then tracing the consequences.    
 It goes without saying that the cognitive assumptions that drive these models 
are very far-reaching but also slightly “schizofrenic.”  A good illustration is 
provided by the key assumption in the property rights approach that “... even 
though the agents are not capable of writing a contract that avoids hold-up 
problems, they are clever enough to understand (at least roughly) the consequences 
of their inability to do so” (Hart 1990: 699).  More technically, the agents are capable 
of performing a dynamic programming exercise that involves knowing, at least 
probabilistically, the joint surplus produced by with their relation ¾ although they 
may be ignorant about (some of) the sources of that surplus.  This assumption may 
                                                 
5 Apropos the interaction between cognition and motivation, Durkheim (1964) argued that ambiguity 
demotivates. The lack of ambiguity in economic models is a further way of repressing this 
interaction.  
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make formal sense (Maskin and Tirole 1999); however, ”… not everything that is 
logically consistent is credulous,” as David Kreps (1996: 565) laconically observes.  
A related assumption is also made in (verbal) transaction cost economics where 
Williamson has consistently maintained that economic agents successfully can 
engage in “farsighted contracting” although they are bounded rational, an 
assumption that has been strongly criticized as bordering on inconsistency by Dow 
(1987) (see further Foss 2001). 
Bounded Rationality  
 “Bounded rationality” deserves special mention here, because it is directly 
relevant to the cognition/motivation separation that is under scrutiny here (see also 
Schlicht 1990 for a related discussion). Some writers in the economics of 
organization, notably Williamson, see bounded rationality as a crucial assumption: 
“But for bounded rationality,” he argues (1996: 36), “all issues of organization 
collapse in favor of comprehensive contracting of either Arrow-Debreu or 
mechanism design kinds.”  However, it is striking that a notion that is claimed to 
constitute a necessary behavioral assumption is never defined with much precision 
in the economics of organization literature.6  Williamson usually confines himself to 
quoting Simon’s famous dictum from the preface of Administrative Behavior that BR 
refers to man being “intendedly rational, but limitedly so.” Some writers make 
hasty reference to Simonian information processing arguments (Hart 1990: 698; 
Schwartz 1992: 80). Thus, if agents do not have the mental capacity to think through 
the whole decision tree ¾ for example, in complicated bilateral trading relations ¾, 
it seems reasonable to assume that some of the branches of the tree (such as those 
relating to some future uses of assets) cannot be represented in a contract; the 
contract is left incomplete. In a central chapter (5, “Bounded Rationality and Private 
                                                 
6 One may speculate that this has to do with the virtual absence in modern economics of a specific, 
affirmative, generally agreed-upon program for research in BR.  Nevertheless, a multitude of 
differing interpretations of BR do exist, some of them extremely formal (Rubinstein 1998), so it 
certainly is possible to adopt some precise definition of BR as a foundational assumption in the 
economics of organization literature.  This is, however, never done. 
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Information”) in their well-known textbook, Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 128) define 
bounded rationality as a matter of ”[l]imited foresight, imprecise language, the costs 
of calculating solutions and the costs of writing down a plan.” They go on to 
develop at length the implications of this in terms of imperfect contracts and 
subsequent problems of imperfect commitment between contractual parties.  
However, they, too, do not develop or truly explain their definition of bounded 
rationality.     
 The reason why economists of organization are less than eager to adopt 
precise, constraining definitions of what BR may mean with respect to individual 
behavior likely is that they simply do not see any reasons for adopting such 
definitions.  Williamson is quite explicit here.  He notes that “[e]conomizing on 
bounded rationality takes two forms.  One concerns decision processes and the 
other involves governance structures.  The use of heuristic problem-solving … is a 
decision process response” (Williamson 1985: 46).  The latter “form” is not central, 
however, in transaction cost economics, which “… is principally concerned … with 
the economizing consequences of assigning transactions to governance structures in 
a discriminating way.” In practice, this means that bounded rationality is simply a 
loose background kind of assumption that informally allows one to explain why 
contracts are incomplete.7   
Motivation 
 The neglect of bounded rationality in the economic theory of the firm also 
implies that there is no attention to those heuristics, rules of thumb, etc. have 
occupied the attention of behavioral scientists for quite some time, notably, of 
course, Herbert Simon and his colleagues and students.  As noted, Williamson 
                                                 
7 Oliver Hart (1990) goes further, and denies that bounded rationality is necessary for the theory of 
the firm.  This is because what bounded rationality is supposed to do ¾ namely, rationalize 
contractual incompleteness and therefore the inefficient investment levels that are centerstage in 
much contract theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995) ¾  can be done more elegantly by 
asymmetric information assumptions, particularly the assumption that investments in a relation are 
unverifiable by a third party (e.g., a judge).    
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(1996) explicitly says that transaction cost economics is not taken up with “decision 
premises.”  A relatively recent development in cognitive science is the attempt to 
link the emotions to bounded rationality.   Emotions are seen as part of those “fast 
and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002) that secure adaptability.  To use 
an example, whereas an economist will, if pressed on the issue, treat a feeling such 
as jealousy as a driver of motivations (i.e., as underlying the agents’ preferences), to 
the proponents of the fast and frugal heuristics programme, jealousy simultaneosly 
provides motivation and a decision heuristic; thus, there is no clear separation 
between the cognitive and the motivational.  
 A number of writers (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Osterloh and Frey 2000) 
have recently taken issue with the assumption in the economics of organization that 
all motivation is invariably of the “extrinsic” type, that is, all behavior is understood 
in terms of encouragement from an external force, such as the expectance of a 
monetary reward. (In contrast, when “intrinsically” motivated, an individuals wish 
to undertake a task for its own sake (Deci and Ryan 1985).8)  The thrust of this 
critique seems to relate purely to what in motivational terms drives individual 
behavior, whereas cognitive issues seem to outside of its orbit.   However, although 
the arguments are not strictly congruent, acting in an intrinsically motivated 
manner may, at least to an outside observer at least, mean much the same as acting 
“appropriately to the situation” in the sense of March (1994).  In both cases, the 
agent does not maximize “wealth.”  Indeed, at least some parts of intrinsically 
motivated behavior may consist of acting appropriately to the situation, indicating 
that the notion of intrinsic motivation may represent the same blurring of the 
cognitive and the motivational domains that the notion of the logic of 
appropriateness indicates.  
Summary 
                                                 
8  For an interesting attempt to treat intrinsic and extrinsic motivation simultaneously in a principal-
agent model, see Benabou and Tirole (2002).  
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 In the modern economics of organization, not only are cognition and 
motivation treated as one-dimensional constructs, there is also (partly for this 
reason) little real interaction between them.  To be sure, there is a link between 
cognition and motivation. For example, in agency theory principals may improve 
their estimates of agents’ effort levels (Holmström 1979).  This reduces the risk 
premium that has to be paid to the agent (because the variance on the estimate is 
reduced), making it possible to give him higher-powered incentives, and increasing 
the total created value in the relation between principal and agent.  In other words, 
principals are motivated to undertake the cognitive operations of collecting and 
processing improved signals of effort (until the costs equal the benefits of doing so).   
However, there is no real interaction, in the sense that motives are allowed to 
influence cognition or vice versa.   And  there is certainly no recognition of the more 
radical point that the boundaries between motivation and cognition may be rather  
blurry (but see McLeod 2000 for an exception).   
 The theory of the firm began in Coase (1937) with the argument that the 
existence of the firm was rooted in imperfect cognition.  However, as the theory 
took of and became a part of mainstream microeconomics, imperfect cognition was 
pushed aside in favor of an overriding concern with imperfectly aligned incentives 
as the key to the understanding of economic organization.   To be sure, the incentive 
focus with uniform, correct cognition has been most productive and useful.  Also, it 
would be foolish to deny that incentive conflict issues are important determinants of 
observed economic organization.  The present paper is not an argument for the 
“knowledge-based” position that incentive conflicts be black-boxed in order to 
focus in an equally lop-sided manner on purely cognitive issues (Kogut and Zander 
1992).  Rather, the argument is that cognitive issues be introduced more explicitly 
and be allowed to interact with motivational issues.   The following looks at this in 
more detail. 
 
III. Interacting Cognition and Motivation                             
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Interacting Cognition and Motivation  
 The strict separation of the motivational and the cognitive domains that is 
characteristic of economics in general surely has, and has had, a number of 
beneficial effects: It neatly keeps difficult assumptions apart and thus does not 
unnecessarily complicate discourse.  For addressing and resolving many problems 
in social science, the separation may not only be entirely valid, it may be necessary 
for reasons of analytical parsimony.  Still, it is not a generally applied strategy in 
social science (including management studies) and psychology. It may indeed not 
be a universally superior approach, in the sense that there are phenomena that are 
difficult to comprehend in their complexity if we insist on breaking up motivational 
and cognitive drivers of behavior in neat separate boxes.  
 In particular, in the context of organizational life, separating cognition and 
motivation may in many cases be a too strong affront to realism.   It is no 
coincidence that a classic contribution to organization science has it that ´”[t]he 
steps that lead, for an actor, to his defining the situation in a particular way involve 
a complex interweaving of affective and cognitive processes.  What a person wants 
and likes influences what he sees; what he sees influences what he wants and likes” 
(March and Simon 1958: 158).  The authors explicitly link this reasoning to bounded 
rationality, noting that boundedly rational choice is “… always exercised with 
respect to a limited, approximate, simplified ‘model’ of the real situation” (March 
and Simon 1958: 160).  This model “… represents a simplified, screened, and biased 
model of the objective situation … and affects all of the ‘givens’ that enter into the 
decision process” (idem: 175), where motivational factors are part of the “givens.” 
Per implication, motivational factors may be influenced by the provision of 
cognitive frames. Lindenberg (2003: 52; italics in original) provides a nice 
encapsulation of the thrust of this kind of reasoning:  
People’s perception of a situation is selective.  When we say that a person has a 
certain frame we mean that, compared to another frame, this person thinks 
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of certain things more readily, is more sensitive to certain kinds of 
information, perceives certain alternatives more readily than others, and 
assigns different weights to certain aspects.  To focus on certain aspects 
also means that other aspects are cognitively pushed into the background.  This 
process is governed by goals in the sense that in the competition between 
goals in a situation one wins out and dominates the foreground as well as 
the major cognitive processes while the other goals are pushed into the 
background. 
A classic illustration is the famous Milgram (1974) experiments concerning 
obedience to authority, in which the experimental subjects were asked to administer 
electrical shock to persons that acted the various reactions to what was believed by 
the experimental subjects to be real electrical shocks.  The shocking conclusion was 
that people were prepared to inflict very severe pain on other people, if instructed 
to do so by the scientists.  Thus, by framing the situation as an experiment run by 
experts, Milgram manipulated motivational factors.  As an economist would have it, 
the disutility associated with administering electrical shocks to other people was 
influenced by this framing.     
 With respect to organizational life, the obvious implication is that an important 
part of the activity of management is essentially a cognitive one designed to 
influence motivations.  In fact, March and Simon (1958: 179) develop an argument 
that it easier to effect control to influencing cognitive premises than by directly 
trying to influence agents’ motivations. They argue that motivations in 
organizations often emerge through complicated psycho-social affective processes 
and are likely to be less flexible, whereas cognitive processes are plastic. By 
influencing the framing of situations, management can redirect the attention of 
employees and thereby indirectly steer goals and motivations in certain directions.    
 The perhaps most sophisticated contemporary account of such “cognitive 
governance” is due to Siegward Lindenberg.  In a string of papers, he (e.g., 
Lindenberg 2003) has constructed an overarching argument that is argued to also 
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encompass the basic organizational economics notion that behavior is primarily 
influenced by the provision of external rewards.  Key to this argument is the 
distinction between three different frames, namely “hedonic,” “gain” and 
“normative” frames.  In the first frame, the goal is to improve social and physical 
well-being directly and immediately.  Short-term opportunistic taking advantage of 
other persons fall into this category.  The “gain” frame is longer-run and is 
concerned with increasing wealth (e.g., investing in education in order to increase 
the value of one’s human capital).  The “normative” frame is directed by the goal 
“to act appropriately,” that is, according to norms.   In this perspective, a key 
management activity is to make sure that the myopic hedonic frame does not crowd 
out the gain or the normative frame.  Moreover, the key management problem is to 
balance the gain frame and the normative frame so that “… relational concerns keep 
the pursuit of gains in check and, conversely, the pursuit of gains keeps excesses of 
relational concerns in check” (Lindenberg 2003: 72).  This is partially accomplished 
through sending “relational signals” in the form of communication, demonstrating 
commitment to fairness, etc. The reason is that “employees … interpret the 
organization’s actions as relational signals, as telltale signs of the ‘true’ orientation 
(frame)” (p.70).  For example, employees may look to how other employees are 
treated in order to extract information about the organizations commitment to 
relational concerns (see also Kreps 1990).   
 This is not the place to provide an extended summary of Lindenberg’s rich and 
complicated theorizing on these issues.  What has been said should suffice to 
suggest that what his argument (as well as those of other organizational scholars 
who are or have been working along similar lines) amounts to are micro-level 
accounts of how, in the economist’s terminology, “implicit contracts” arise, are 
maintained, changed, etc., and how both motivational and cognitive factors enter 
into such constructs.   In order to suggest the relevance of this work to the economic 
theory of the firm, I discuss how our understanding of the limits to and constraints 
on selective intervention is enhanced by such a more sophisticated understanding of 
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interacting cognition and motivation.  I emphasize that this is merely one example 
out of many possible.     
 
IV. Cognition, Motivation, and                                                      
the “Impossibility of Selective Intervention” 
The Problem 
 A key theme in the theory of the firm (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1996) is 
that the exercise of authority in the form of managerial fiat provides a reason why 
firms exist.  As Williamson (1985, 1996) points out this rationale raises a puzzle 
(indeed, a “chronic puzzle”), namely what determines the optimum size of firms 
and their efficient boundaries.  His take on the issue and attempt to solve the puzzle 
begin from asking, “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of small 
firms can do and more?”  The reason why that question is worth asking is that it 
builds on plausible premises but lead to implausible conclusions, to wit, that all 
economic activity will be organized in one giant firm.   
 Consider two competing firms.  Net gains should always be expected from a 
merger, because of savings on overheads, economies of scale, coordination of 
pricing decisions, etc.  Little needs to change on the level of organization.  What 
were previously autonomous firms may now be units with semi-autonomous 
status.  Importantly, incentives may be as high-powered as they were prior to 
integration.  The decisions that are most efficiently made at the levels of operations 
will be made there. “Intervention at the top thus occurs selectively, which is to say 
only upon a showing of expected net gains” (Williamson 1985: 133).  This implies 
that the combined firm can do everything the stand-alone firms could and more, so 
that“… integration realizes adaptive gains but experiences no losses” (p.161).  
Clearly, the argument may be extended to vertical mergers or conglomerate 
mergers.  And equally clearly, the argument implies that merger activity will go on 
until all economic activity is undertaken by one single firm.   Since we don’t observe 
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this organization of economic activity, selective intervention must be associated 
with some “losses” that offset the benefits of integration at the margin. 
 It is important to note that the impossibility of selective intervention argument 
does not imply that there may not be gains from integration, and that sometimes 
selective intervention can successfully take place “upon a showing of expected net 
gains” (as argued by, e.g., Goold, Campbell and Alexander 1994 and Foss 1997).  
What is “impossible” is only the fiction of costless selective intervention.  What, 
then, are the costs of selective intervention?   
 In his first work on the issue, Williamson (1985) focuses on incentive 
distortions that arise in the form of what he there calls “asset malutilization” and 
“accounting contrivance” problems that arise upon merger.9  However, in his 
subsequent work on selective intervention (Williamson 1993, 1996), he has 
increasingly come to focus on what are essentially managerial commitment 
problems.  A fundamental problem here is that the option to intervene ”… can be 
exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad (to 
support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151), it may be 
difficult to verify the nature of the cause, and promises to only intervene for good 
cause are hard to make credible because they are not enforceable in a court of law. 
There is thus a problem of “… credibly [promising] to respect autonomy save for 
those cases where expected net gains to intervention can be projected” (Williamson 
1993: 104).  A basic problem ¾ in theory as well as managerial practice ¾ is 
therefore how to maximize managerial intervention for “good cause,” while 
avoiding intervention for “bad cause.” However, since intervention for “bad cause” 
                                                 
9 The first cause, “asset malutilization,” appeals to cost of measuring the wear and tear of equipment.  
Given such costs, owner-managers who become managers in the merged firm will utilize equipment 
with less care and invest less in maintenance.  The second one arises when the integrating firm promises 
to pay a low price for the assets of the integrated firm in exchange for a promise of a favorable net receipt 
stream, but then post integration, squeezes the net receipts of the integrated firms by means of accounting 
manipulation.   Both problems arise because incentives in the merged firm are high-powered.  Recourse 
to low-powered incentives is to be expected.  The attendant organizational failures help explain the 
optimum size (the efficient boundaries) of the firm. 
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is not entirely unavoidable, costless selective intervention is indeed a fiction, and 
inefficiencies are strictly unavoidable.  This implies that firm sizes are bounded well 
below the maximum of organizing all productive activity in the world.    
Selective Intervention, Motivation and Cognition 
 The reason Williamson’s (1996) distinction between intervention for good 
cause and intervention for bad cause (i.e., opportunistic managerial intervention) is 
so fundamental is because it directs attention to the organizational costs of 
managerial authority.    However, Williamson appears to be content with noting 
the incentive liabilities that unavoidably accompany fiat.  He does not subject these 
liabilities to closer scrutiny, nor does he discuss how they may be minimized or 
whether they may differ across firms. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) go 
somewhat further than Williamson by conceptualizing the problem as one of one 
sustaining superior equilibria in repeated employee/employer games (cf. also Kreps 
1990). Foss, Foss and Vázquez-Vicente (2003) frame the problem as one of 
managerial credible commitments and identify and test some of the determinants of 
such commitments.  The preceding discussion of cognition and motivation allows 
for further elaboration.   
 Perceiving Intervention.  It is an implication of the notion of framing 
(Lindenberg 2003) that employee motivation is mediated by perceptions of what 
motivates managerial intervention, notably whether managerial motivations reflect 
a hedonic or a normative frame, that is, whether intervention takes place for bad or 
good reasons (Williamson 1996).  Whether managerial intervention will or will not  
break with existing psychological (Rousseau 1989; Robinson and Morrison 1995; 
Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000) or implicit (Kreps 1990) contracts cannot be 
understood separately from this.  Thus, what may to an outside observer look like a 
flagrant violation of psychological contracts, for example, a massive reneging of 
delegation, may in actuality be intervention that is undertaken for good cause – for 
example, as the only rational response to a major organizational crisis – and hence 
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be understood by employees as behavior that reflects the adoption of a normative 
frame by management.   
 Conversely, managerial intervention that objectively benefits all relevant 
parties may be perceived by employees as breaking with psychological contracts 
and reflecting a hedonic or gain frame on the part of management.  In sum, in 
ascertaining the nature of managerial intervention, employees face a complicated 
signal extraction problem.  Because employees cannot always correctly extract 
information from signals ?  intervention for good cause may be confused with 
intervention for bad cause and vice versa ?  mistakes will be made, and inefficiencies 
are strictly unavoidable.   
 Employee entitlements. The psychological literature on cognitive biases suggests 
further reasons why motivation may be harmed by opportunistic managerial 
intervention.  In an employee relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit 
expectations of the contract governing the relationship (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 
2000), and particularly of the benefits that they believe they deserve under the 
implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et al. 1993).  For example, 
certain levels of delegated discretion may become “status quo” points, in the sense 
that they represent what employees believe are their entitlements.  Thus, if 
employees enjoy considerable discretion this may become part of their (perceived) 
entitlements. As discussed earlier, loss aversion implies that a loss relative to the 
status quo point is seen as more undesirable than a gain relative to the same point is 
seen as desirable.  This means that employees will develop a bias against changing 
the level of discretion in a downwards direction, and that they can be expected to 
resist such changes, as well as suffer a loss of motivation if the change is, in fact, 
forced upon them. 
 Constraining harmful selective intervention. The analysis suggests that a key 
management problem is managing cognition in order to minimize the incentive 
liabilities associated with selective intervention.  The relevant relational signalling 
may take several forms (Foss and Foss 2003).  
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 Notably, managers may stake their personal reputations.  This may be done 
through symbolic and communicative acts, for example, announcing in large-scale 
company gatherings one’s firm commitment to certain policies and values.  It can, of 
course, also be done through consistently abstaining from harmful intervention.   
 Even if no explicit commitments to abstain harmful exercise of authority are 
issued, there are still a number of features of the organization of the firm that may 
serve as credible commitments.  
 First, hierarchical structure itself plays a role.  Thus, delegated discretion may 
be partly protected if lower level managers are required to refer to higher-level 
managers for authorization to overrule decisions made by of employee’s. This will 
be the case if upper and lower-level managers differ in their preferences for 
overruling, for example, lower-level managers derive a private benefit from 
overruling, whereas upper-level managers do not (Aghion and Tirole 1997). 
Another reason why hierarchical structure may constrain managerial intervention is 
that the hierarchy is not just a structure of authority, but also one of information.  
Thus, there will be an informational distance between those possessing authority 
and those to whom discretion has been delegated.  The size of this informational 
distance influences the basis for exercising judgment with respect to decisions 
whether to overrule employees or not. All else being equal, the more hierarchical 
layers that information has to pass through before reaching the level exercising 
authority, the less adequate is this basis likely to be.   
 Also, some employees or groups of employee may also be particularly costly 
for management to overrule, because their discretion is not only formally delegated, 
but also strongly grounded in the real control of critical resources, notably 
specialized human capital, ability to charismatic leadership, a favorable reputation 
with certain customers, etc. 
 Finally, strong trade unions or professional associations are forces outside of 
the firm that constrains harmful selective intervention. Competitive forces also 
constrain harmful managerial exercise of authority.  In particular, competition for 
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employees is an important constraint.  Thus, frustrated employees are more likely to 
be bid away by competitor firms. Moreover, financial markets constrain harmful 
managerial exercise of authority, as least as a rough tendency, because these actions 
have a negative impact on profitability. 
 In sum, there are quite a number of mechanisms that constrain harmful 
managerial intervention by informing employees that it will be too costly for 
management to selectively intervene in a harmful manner.  These mechanisms 
thereby stabilize employee motivation.   Also, at least some of these mechanisms 
can be influenced by management in the process of cognitive management.  
 Firm heterogeneity.  The argument that the interaction between cognition and 
motivation in the formation of employee expectations is an important factor in 
understanding the incentive liabilities associated with selective intervention also 
allows for a better understanding of firm heterogeneity.  Thus, firms in the same 
industry often differ with respect to “corporate culture.”  They often also differ with 
respect to internal organization (i.e., the internal allocation of decision rights) and 
where they draw their boundaries.   On the background of the argument developed 
in this paper, these two observations emerge as two sides of the same coin.   
 Cognition and motivation interact in complicated ways, and the outcomes of 
such processes may differ dramatically across a population of firms, because of 
random factors in employees’ perceptions of managerial relational signalling.  Thus, 
occasionally selective intervention for good cause may be mistaken for intervention 
for bad cause, and vice versa.   Such differences may be sufficient to produce 
differences in psychological (implicit) contracts in firms, that is, different corporate 
cultures (Kreps 1990).  In turn, this means that firm will differ with respect to their 
organizational costs.  And this has implications for where they place their 
boundaries, firms with low organizational costs being more integrated than those 
with higher organizational costs.  
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IV. Conclusions 
 
The modern economic theory of the firm with its clear emphasis on incentive 
conflicts, downplaying of cognitive issues and separation between motivation and 
cognition has surely contributed very significantly to our understanding of key 
organizational mechanisms.  The placing of cognitive and motivational issues in 
separate boxes is consistent with the traditional “situational determinism” (Latsis 
1972) of economics, that is, the analyst seeks to derive “single-exit” (unique) 
solutions.  In contrast, recognizing that motivation that may be either intrinsic or 
extrinsic, emphasizing differential cognition and even allowing cognition and 
motivation to interact complicates theorizing, in some cases perhaps drastically.  
The emphasis on criteria such as tractability and simplicity as hallmarks of good 
science is the main factor the may be invoked of a hope that the “twain shall never 
meet.”    
 In contrast to this, it can be argued that although allowing for interaction 
between cognition and motivation surely complicates theorizing, the situation is not 
hopeless; thus, there is no inherent reason why such interaction should not be given 
to the kind of modeling that characterizes contract theory.  On the less 
methodological and more substantive side, it may finally be argued that too much 
of the essence of what organizations are and what managers do for organizations is 
missed if the interaction between cognition and motivation is suppressed.  Thus, I 
offered the example of the problem of selective intervention to demonstrate that 
taking much fuller account of motivational and cognitive issues allow us to gain 
added insight into an important issues in the economics of organization. 
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